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YES, BUT WHAT HAVE THEY DONE TO BLACK PEOPLE
LATELY? THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
IN THE VIRGINIA SCHOOL BOARD CASE
PEYTON MCCRARY*
INTRODUCrION
The protection of minority voting rights is currently facing its
most serious challenge in the courts since 1966, the year the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act.1 The most critical attack lies in the area of congressional
redistricting, where, in 1993, the United States Supreme Court, in
Shaw v. Reno,2 ruled that white plaintiffs challenging the bizarre
shape of the black-majority Twelfth Congressional District in North
Carolina had a right to a full trial on the merits of their claim.
Although the North Carolina plaintiffs lost at trial,3 other courts have
decided in favor of voters in Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas.4 These
courts ruled that taking race into account in drawing district lines-
even in order to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act-
could constitute reverse discrimination against white voters. Under
this approach, where racial purpose is the predominant motive in the
adoption of a districting plan, the legislature's decision cannot be justi-
fied by the need to comply with the Voting Rights Act, and thus trig-
* Historian, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice; B.A., M.A., 1965,
1966 University of Virginia; Ph.D., 1972 Princeton University. An earlier version of this paper
was presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association, November 7, 1992.
Its genesis lies in research performed as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in Irby v. Fitz-hugh,
693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d
1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990), while a professor of history at the Univer-
sity of South Alabama; an earlier draft was written while a visiting scholar at the Joint Center for
Political and Economic Studies, Washington. D.C., thanks to financial support from the John D.
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. I wish to thank Larry Hartzell, Kathleen Andrews,
and Dianne Thompson for research assistance and Neil Bradley, J. Gerald Hebert, Ricardo
Romo, Bradley Rice, and David J. Garrow for editorial suggestions. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Justice.
1. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
2. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
3. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
4. Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La. 1993), vacated and remanded, 114 S. Ct.
2731 (1994), on remand, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 687 (1994);
Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1984); Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D.
Ga. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 713 (1995).
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gers strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court heard the Louisiana and
Georgia cases in the spring of 1995. It reversed the lower court ruling
in Louisiana on the grounds that the plaintiffs, who did not reside in
the black-majority district under challenge, did not have standing to
sue.5 In the Georgia case, however, the court affirmed the trial court
decision and thus effectively transformed the Fourteenth Amendment,
once a weapon for attacking minority vote dilution, into a bulwark of
its defense. 6
The erosion of Fourteenth Amendment protection in voting
rights law began in the late 1980s with the lower court decisions in
Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections.7 In Irby, black plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Virginia's laws requiring the appoint-
ment, rather than the election, of all local school boards. Historical
evidence of racially discriminatory intent between the 1870s and the
1970s played a pivotal role in their case. Both the trial judge and the
appeals court conceded that during past decades the state had main-
tained the appointive system for invidious racial motives. But, be-
cause the plaintiffs did not prove that recent legislative decisions to
maintain the status quo were also racially discriminatory in purpose,
the courts dismissed the significance of the historical evidence.8 Addi-
tionally, both courts ruled that the appointive system no longer had a
discriminatory effect on black representation. 9 As a result the plain-
5. United States v. Hays, 63 U.S.L.W. 4679 (1995).
6. Miller v. Johnson, 63 U.S.L.W. 4726 (1995).
7. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). I served as an
expert witness for the plaintiffs at trial, and historian Peter Stewart testified for the state. Refer-
ences to expert testimony are to the trial transcript.
8. As discussed in more detail below, the trial court, Judge Richard Williams, concluded
that a 1971 revision of the state constitution, which the plaintiffs had not shown to be racially
motivated, purged the appointive system of discriminatory intent (even though the alternative of
elected school boards was not discussed in the revision process). Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp.
at 433. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with this assessment but focused on the
decision of a legislative committee that seriously considered switching to elective school boards
in 1984, but rejected the idea. Because plaintiffs had not proved the 1984 decision was racially
motivated, the appeals court ruled that the appointive process was no longer maintained for
racial discriminatory purposes. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d at 1356.
9. The trial court relied on the fact that in the state as a whole, the percentage of school
board members who were black approximated the percentage of the voting-age population that
was black. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 433-34. The appeals court focused on the results of
the appointive system in the five local jurisdictions represented by individual plaintiffs in the
lawsuit, and concluded that the racial disparities demonstrated by the plaintiffs were not statisti-
cally significant. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d at 1358-59.
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tiffs, who had produced both circumstantial and direct evidence of ra-
cial purpose on the part of state officials, lost the case.
This Article will examine the historical evidence of discriminatory
intent presented by the plaintiffs in the Virginia school board case and
the basis on which the courts minimized the ultimate significance of
this evidence. No courts have followed this precedent in deciding sub-
sequent lawsuits. An analysis is needed, however, because the case
raises disturbing questions about Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence when its use in protecting minority voting rights is under assault
from other quarters.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT IN
MODERN VOTING RIGHTS LAW
A. The Fifteenth Amendment
Before 1965, protection of minority voting rights in the South was
largely a function of the degree to which the federal courts enforced
the constitutional guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments. 10
In 1965, Congress, believing that case-by-case litigation was insuffi-
cient to end systemic racial discrimination in the electoral process of
the former Confederate states, relied on its authority to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment and adopted the Voting Rights Act." The
Supreme Court upheld the statute's novel intervention in electoral
procedures, normally the preserve of state governments, on the
grounds that "the constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 must be judged with reference to the historical experience it re-
flects."' 2 During the next quarter century, the Act, and related deci-
sions by the federal courts on both statutory and constitutional
grounds, have gone a long way toward assuring free access to the bal-
lot box and fair representation in public office for minority voters pre-
viously denied those rights.13
10. See generally Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L.
REV. 523 (1973).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973.
12. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
13. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACr OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
AcT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994); Richard H. Pildes, The
Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1362-69, 1391-92 (1995) (summarizing central findings
in Quiet Revolution in the South).
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B. The Fourteenth Amendment as Applied, 1973 - 1982
By 1973, the Court, drawing on the one-person, one-vote princi-
ple it found in the Fourteenth Amendment (protection against quanti-
tative vote dilution), decided in White v. Register14 that the
constitution also prohibited racial vote dilution, that is, electoral pro-
cedures such as at-large elections or gerrymandered election district
lines that result in diluting the effectiveness of the ballots cast by mi-
nority voters.' 5 In 1980, however, the Court restricted the reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment by requiring plaintiffs in City of Mobile v.
Bolden16 to prove that the at-large elections under challenge not only
had a dilutive effect but were adopted or maintained with a racially
discriminatory purpose.
Even under this new intent standard plaintiffs won on remand by
presenting detailed historical evidence concerning the racial purposes
of the decision-makers. 17 Racially discriminatory intent need not be
the sole, or even the primary, reason for the adoption of the election
practice at issue. According to the standard set forth by the Supreme
Court, plaintiffs seeking to prove a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment must show only "that a discriminatory purpose has been
a motivating factor in the decision.' 8 In investigating whether offi-
cials have acted with discriminatory intent, furthermore, the courts are
to focus on the context in which the decision is made, the views of
decision-makers on related issues, the sequence of events leading to
the decision, and the anticipated effect of the change on minority citi-
zens, not just to direct expressions of purpose by decision-makers.' 9
This approach is consistent with the methodology normally employed
by historians who have testified in a number of important cases con-
cerning this issue.
20
14. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
15. James U. Blacksher & Larry Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v.
Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS
L. J. 1 (1982).
16. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
17. Bolden v. City of Mobile, 542 F. Supp. 1050 (S.D. Ala. 1982); Brown v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 542 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Ala. 1982), affd, 706 F.2d 1103 (11th Cir.
1983), aff'd, 464 U.S. 1005 (1983). See Peyton McCrary, History in the Courts: The Significance
of Bolden v. City of Mobile, in MINORITY VoTE DILU o N 47, 47-65 (Chandler Davidson ed.,
1984).
18. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
19. Id
20. See Peyton McCrary & J. Gerald Hebert, Keeping the Courts Honest: The Role of Hist-
orians as Expert Witnesses in Southern Voting Rights Cases, 16 S.U. L. REV. 101 (1989).
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In 1982, the Congress revised Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
to restore the standard of proof that focused on whether the electoral
procedures at issue have the effect of diluting minority voting strength
without requiring proof of intentional discrimination.21 Since that
time, the courts have decided most voting rights litigation on a statu-
tory basis, rather than under the Constitution.2 In two instances in
the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court decided voting rights cases in
favor of minority plaintiffs on the basis of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.23 These two decisions set forth the standard of proof required
at the time minority plaintiffs filed their challenge to Virginia's system
of appointed school boards.
C Rogers v. Lodge
The first case, Rogers v. Lodge, was decided only two days after
the revised Voting Rights Act was signed into law in 1982, and was a
challenge to at-large elections in Burke County, Georgia.24 In this
case, the Court found that the same legal standard described by the
Congress in 1982 as a results test (the White v. Register "totality of
circumstances" test used in the 1970s) could provide a sufficient basis
for courts to conclude that an election system was being maintained-
even if not originally adopted-for a racially discriminatory purpose.25
As a practical matter, such evidence was probably the same as that
required under the intent prong of the revised Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act.
26
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973, 1988.
22. BERNARD GROFMAN ET. AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOT-
ING EOUALTY 42-81, 141-46 (1992). Even in cases decided under the Voting Rights Act, intent
evidence has sometimes been the key factor in the courts' decision in favor of minority voters.
See County Council of Sumter County, South Carolina v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694
(D.D.C. 1983); Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1986), affd in part,
vacated in part, remanded, 831 F.2d 247 (11th Cir. 1987); Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F.
Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied., 111 S. Ct. 681
(1991).
23. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985),
affg Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984).
24. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
25. For a comparison of the evidence in the Burke County case with the facts in City of
Mobile v. Bolden, see Peyton McCrary, Discriminatory Intent: The Continuing Relevance of 'Pur-
pose' Evidence in Vote-Dilution Lawsuits, 28 How. L.J. 463, 477-80 (1985).
26. J. Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent: Lessons from L.A., 7 J.L. & POL. 591,
702-03 (1991). See also GROFMAN ET AL, supra note 22, at 40-41. I do not, however, agree with
their observation that "the standard for determining the presence of unconstitutional vote dilu-
tion may therefore be a moot issue." See id. at 42.
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D. Hunter v. Underwood
The Court's other Fourteenth Amendment decision, Hunter v.
Underwood,27 unanimously affirmed a lower court ruling striking
down a disfranchising device - the "petty crimes" provision of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901. The evidence of racial intent was une-
quivocal; indeed, the state conceded that a desire to disfranchise
blacks was a substantial factor in adoption of the provision.28 At that
point, the Court observed that the burden shifts to the defendants:
Once racial discrimination is shown to have been a "substantial" or
"motivating" factor behind enactment of the law, the burden shifts to
the law's defenders to demonstrate that the law would have been en-
acted without this factor.2
9
The state of Alabama sought to rebut the plaintiffs' purpose evi-
dence by showing that: 1) the petty crimes clause was designed to dis-
franchise poor whites as well as blacks; and 2) the state "has a
legitimate interest in denying the franchise to those convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude" (i.e., the crimes enumerated in the
1901 provision).30 The Court summarily rejected the idea that a desire
to disfranchise poor whites was a legitimate state interest that
trumped the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claim.31 It also dis-
missed the state's moral turpitude claim, finding that "such a purpose
simply was not a motivating factor of the 1901 convention" and that
the "crimes involving moral turpitude" enumerated by the convention
were "thought to be more commonly committed by blacks.
32
Once the Court determined that the petty crimes provision was
adopted with a discriminatory purpose, it had to decide whether the
device had a racially discriminatory impact. The immediate impact
was stark: the provision "disfranchised approximately ten times as
many blacks as whites" between its adoption in 1901 and January,
1903. 33 As to its current effect at the time of trial, the Court focused
on the disparate impact in the two counties where the appellees (black
persons disfranchised by the provision) resided: "This disparate effect
27. 471 U.S. 222 (1985), affg Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984).
28. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 230-31.
29. Id. at 228 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
30. Id. at 232.
31. Id. "Whether or not intentional disfranchisement of poor whites would qualify as a
'permissible motive' within the meaning of Palmer and Michael M., it is clear that where both
impermissible racial motivation and racially discriminatory
impact are demonstrated, Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the proper analysis." Id.
32. Id. (quoting a learned treatise read into the record by the state's own expert historian).
33. Id. (quoting the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614,
620 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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persists today. In Jefferson and Montgomery Counties blacks are by
even the most modest estimates at least 1.7 times as likely as whites to
suffer disfranchisement under section 182 for the commission of non-
prison offenses." 34
The degree of proof that a system adopted with a racial purpose
continues to have a discriminatory impact is less substantial than that
required to meet the effects test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Had the appellate court in the Virginia school board case applied this
standard, arguably the plaintiffs would have been entitled to a judg-
ment in their favor. The Irby court did not, however, refer at all to
Hunter.
II. APPOINTIVE SCHOOL BOARDS BEFORE DISFRANCHISEMENT
A. Selection by the State Board of Education, 1870 - 1877
The historical evidence in Irby went back to the Reconstruction
period. Virginia first established its statewide public school system in
1870 under the leadership of William Henry Ruffner, whom the first
"redeemed" (post-Reconstruction) legislature chose as state superin-
tendent of public instruction. The statute Ruffner drafted for Con-
servative legislators provided that a new state board of education
would appoint all local school trustees in the state.35 The purpose of
empowering the state board, consisting of Superintendent Ruffner,
the governor, and the attorney general, to appoint all school trustees
and county superintendents was, quite simply, to provide a reliable
mechanism for getting the job done. 36 Thus, the trial judge correctly
noted that "there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
original decision to make school boards appointive rather than elec-
tive was motivated by racial discrimination. '3 7 On the other hand,
there is no reason to doubt that the Conservative legislature intended
34. Id. (once again quoting the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Underwood v. Hunter, 730
F.2d at 620.).
35. Act of July 7, 1870, ch. 259, 1870 Va. Acts 402. For a more thorough account of
Ruffner's achievements, see JACK P. MADDEX, JR., THE VIRGINIA CONSERVATIVES, 1867-1879:
A STUDY IN RECONSTRUCTION PoLrIcs 204-14 (1970); Walter J. Fraser, Jr., William Henry
Ruffner and the Establishment of Virginia's Public School System, 1870-1874, VIRGINIA MAoA-
ZINE OF HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY 259-79 (July 1971). Ruffner, whose father had served as
president of Washington College in Lexington before the war, was endorsed for the job by that
institution's current president in 1869, Robert E. Lee, and other leaders of the Conservative
Party (i.e., the Democrats). Id.
36. Ruffner spent the summer of 1870 scouring the state for qualified personnel, resisting to
the extent possible demands of Conservative politicos for appointment of their local supporters
as trustees. Fraser, supra note 35, at 262-66.
37. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
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that only whites be appointed to school boards. "White supremacy,"
as historian Jack P. Maddex notes, was "an article of faith" for the
Virginia Conservatives.38
In 1871, the legislature began the shift to local selection of school
boards, authorizing city councils to appoint municipal school trustees
for each ward and incorporating existing municipal boards into the
new state system.39 White control of the schools was, under this selec-
tion method, dependent upon a Conservative majority on the city
council. A look at the actions of several Virginia cities concerning this
election method demonstrates the importance of party affiliation in
the city council.
In Norfolk, which had established a public school system in 1857,
the Conservatives successfully made white control of the schools a
racial issue in the 1870 municipal elections.40 In Richmond, public
schools were established in 1869 while Republicans were still in
power. Once Conservatives regained control of city government in
1870, however, they placed their own supporters on the school board
at the first opportunity. White families preferred the city's flourishing
private schools, and as a consequence black enrollment in the public
schools was in the majority. The school board tried to use as many
white teachers as possible in the black schools, but placed the more
competent white instructors in the white schools. Even so, many
Richmond whites complained that educating blacks was likely to spoil
them for manual labor.41
Petersburg, where the Republicans had established public schools
as early as 1868, was the only major city still under Republican control
in the early 1870s. Consistent with the party's stated principles, the
council appointed blacks to the school board and supported the
schools generously. When Conservatives won a majority of the Pet-
ersburg City Council in the 1874 elections, one of their first actions
38. MADDEX, supra note 35, at 184. In their view, says Maddex, "the reins of government
and society should remain in the hands of members of the white race." Id. at 191. Compared to
their counterparts in the deep South, however, the Virginians were, he notes, "moderate white
supremacists." Id.
39. According to Kilpatrick v. Smith, 77 Va. 347, 352 (1883), an 1871 session law made each
city ward a separate school district with its own trustees, analogous to the sub-county district
trustees in rural areas.
40. A Republican victory "means negro magistrates on your bench, negro policemen on
your streets, negro legislators in your councils... negro commissioners in your schools," warned
the Norfolk Journal, May 20, 1870, reprinted in THOMAS J. WERTENBAKER, NORFOLK: HISTORIC
Sourmm, PORT 245 (Marvin W. Schlegel ed., 2d. ed. 1962).
41. MICHAEL B. CHlESSON, RJcIoND AFrER THE WAR, 1865-1890, at 101, 166-67 (1981);
HOWARD N. RABNowrrLz, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SouTH, 1865-1890, at 153, 173-74,
179 (1978).
[Vol. 70:1275
1995] HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IN THE VIRGINIA SCHOOL BOARD CASE 1283
was to appoint a new school board. In 1875, with state aid declining,
the new Conservative school board initiated a policy requiring parents
to have paid all their taxes before their children could attend school;
enrollments immediately dropped 43 percent.42 Thus, party clearly
made a difference in educational policy.
B. Appointment by Local Commissions, 1877 - 1884
Contrary to their handling of municipal school boards, the Con-
servatives did not turn the appointment of county school boards over
to local officials until 1877, when they had reduced the Republican
Party at the state level to a position of powerlessness.4 3 Under this
scheme, a local board consisting of the county's judge, its common-
wealth's attorney, and its school superintendent chose all school trust-
ees."4 The party that controlled the state government would control at
least two of the three members of the selection board: 1) the General
Assembly, then as now, appointed all judges; and 2) the State Board
of Education appointed county school superintendents. Conse-
quently, only the local commonwealth's attorney had to go before the
voters. Thus, even in counties where their opponents were strong
enough to elect the local prosecutor, Conservatives would still control
the selection of trustees. Elected school boards could have had quite
a different effect, for even in 1877 some black-majority counties and
city wards were likely to elect representatives of their choice.45
Historians have long identified other provisions adopted by this
"Redeemer" legislature as racially motivated. A series of Constitu-
tional amendments subsequently ratified by the voters sought to limit
black political participation or to minimize its effects. One amend-
ment gave the General Assembly power to change the form of gov-
ernment for municipalities in order to deal with black-majority
42. WILLIAM D. HENDERSON, GILDED AGE CITY: PoLrIcs, LIFE AND LABOR IN PETERS-
BURG, VIRGINIA, 1874-1889, at 132-35 (1980); MADDEX, supra note 35, at 202.
43. The Republicans did not even nominate a gubernatorial candidate in 1877. CHARLES E.
WYNEs, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA, 1870-1902, at 14 (1961). Wynes notes that "one-party
rule and white supremacy were near accomplished facts in Virginia." Id.
44. Act of Jan. 11, 1877, ch. 12,1877 Va. Acts 9. WILLIAM A. LINK, A HARD COUNTRY AND
A LONELY PLACE: SCHOOLING, SOCIETY, AND REFORM IN RURAL VIRGINIA, 1870-1920, at 20
(1986). It should be noted that William Link incorrectly dates the shift to local appointment of
county school trustees at 1873.
45. MADDEX, supra note 35, at 200; Trial transcript I, at 18, Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp.
424 (E.D. Va. 1988) (No. 88-2919) (McCrary testimony) [hereinafter Trial transcript I], aff'd sub
nom. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
906 (1990).
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communities still under Republican control.46 Another racially moti-
vated amendment required proof of payment of the annual poll tax as
a prerequisite for voting.47 Still another amendment prohibited voting
by anyone convicted of petit larceny; Conservatives saw this "petty
crimes" provision as a way of minimizing black voting strength.48
These amendments illustrate that the legislature acted with discrim-
inatory purposes in adopting these election laws, thereby reinforcing
the inference that the system of local electoral boards established in
1877 was designed by the Conservative majority to limit the chances
of blacks serving on school boards. The trial court in Irby, however,
found the evidence on this point "mixed. '
49
Between 1879 and 1883, a new coalition that capitalized on the
votes of small farmers and blacks took control of the state. Under the
leadership of former Confederate General William Mahone, the Re-
adjuster Party allied with the predominantly black Republicans in a
coalition that produced some black electoral victories. For example,
in the 1882 legislature, three of the coalition's senators and eleven of
its delegates were blacks.50 These black legislators won significant
concessions from their Readjuster allies, abolishing the poll tax as a
prerequisite for voting and eliminating the whipping post, which was
used primarily as a punishment for black prisoners.5'
46. WvN~s, supra note 43, at 13. One year earlier, the legislature acceded to the demands
of Petersburg Conservatives, who had just "redeemed" their black-majority city from Republi-
can control, for a charter revision intended "to alter the structure of government in favor of the
property owners." MADDEX, supra note 35, at 202.
47. Richard L. Morton, The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1865-1902, at 93 (1918) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia); WYNEs, supra note 43, at 13-14; MADDEX, supra note
35, at 197-98; J. MORGAN KoUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN PoLxrics: SUFFRAGE RESTRIC-
TION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH 171 (1974).
48. MORTON, supra note 47, at 92; C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH,
1877-1913, at 56 (1951); WYNEs, supra note 43, at 12-13; MADDEX, supra note 35, at 198. A
similar "petty-crimes" provision in Alabama was struck down by a unanimous Supreme Court
decision (authored by then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist), in Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222 (1985).
49. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424, 427 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). The only
evidence Judge Williams cited as a basis for this conclusion, however, was the racial outcome of
appointment in the 1880s, after the Conservatives lost control of state politics: "In counties with
Readjuster or Republican judges, commonwealth attorneys, or school superintendents, the local
trustee electoral boards named board members sympathetic to black education, and in black
majority counties they named blacks as school trustees." Id. These events took place in the
early 1880s, and the Conservative legislature of 1877 could hardly have anticipated these devel-
opments. In describing the effects of the appointive system, the court relied entirely on my
testimony, but confused the chronology of events. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 18, 22. The
state's expert did not comment on the purposes of the 1877 law. See id, at 239-59 (Stewart
testimony).
50. WYNEs, supra note 43, at 22-23.
51. CHARLES C. PIERSON, THE READJUSTER MOVEMENT IN VIRGINIA 145 (1917).
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The Readjusters greatly increased state financial support for the
public schools, and appointed their own followers, including some
blacks, as school trustees, county and city school superintendents, and
judges.52 In Richmond and Portsmouth, the old school board mem-
bers unsuccessfully challenged the legitimacy of the Readjuster ap-
pointees in the courts.5 3 The struggle for control over school boards,
however, was most dramatic in Petersburg. Black citizens in Peters-
burg were angry that the incumbent Conservative board would not
hire black teachers, despite the fact that thirteen licensed black teach-
ers were available. The State Board of Education devised a legal
strategy enabling it to appoint a new school board in Petersburg, in-
cluding three black members. The Readjuster school board then
hired twelve black teachers and named two black principals, integrat-
ing the faculties of some schools and placing black principals over
white teachers.54 Although the black citizens were pleased with the
result, others in the community voiced their displeasure. For example,
the conservative Richmond Times Dispatch expressed outrage that
blacks should be allowed to exercise control over white schoolchild-
ren, teachers, and taxpayers: "Where and when did the [N]egro be-
come possessed of the notion that he was the equal of the white
man?" 55
C. Selection by the General Assembly, 1884 - 1887
In 1883, the Conservatives, now calling themselves Democrats,
used such racial appeals to regain a majority in the legislature. 56 The
Democrats took immediate steps to gain control over the appointment
52. Id. at 145-46, 149-50; Morton, supra note 47, at 108-09, 115, 119; WYNs, supra note 43,
at 21-22. See also NELSON M. BLAKE, WILLIAM MAHONE OF VIRGINIA: SOLDIER AND POLIT-
ICAL INSURGENT 188-92 (1935); CHESSON, supra, note 41 at 185; RABINOwrz, supra note 41, at
178-79. In his testimony, the state's expert incorrectly testified that when the Readjusters gained
control of the state legislature and the governorship: "They don't do anything about education
at that time, not a thing." Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 244 (Stewart testimony).
53. Kilpatrick v. Smith, 77 Va. 347 (1883); Childrey v. Rady, 77 Va. 518 (1883).
54. HENDERSON, supra note 42, at 134-39. The State Board was able to appoint a new
school board because the old board members had not taken the required oath when beginning
their terms.
55. RICHMOND TiMEs DISPATCH, May 26, 1883, quoted in RABINOWITZ, supra note 41, at
178. As liberal social critic Lewis Harvie Blair of Richmond recalled in 1889: "Did not the
appointment by Governor [William E.] Cameron of Virginia of a few Negro school trustees
suffice to hurl from power at the first subsequent election the Republican party [actually, the
Readjuster-Republican coalition] which then controlled every branch of the state government?"
LEWIS H. BLAIR, A SOUTHERN PROPHECY: THE PROSPERITY OF THE SOUTH DEPENDENT UPON
THE ELEVATION OF THE NEGRO 162-63 (C. Vann Woodward ed., 1964).
56. Morton, supra note 47, at 119. As future United States Senator John W. Daniel put it
during the 1883 campaign, "I am a Democrat because I am a white man and a Virginian." Id.
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of school boards by requiring the General Assembly to appoint three
private citizens as a school trustee electoral commission for each local-
ity.5 7 "Why go to Richmond to have the new 'school commissioners'
named?" asked a Readjuster editor from the Shenandoah Valley.
"Do the representatives from all sections of the State know more of
the fitness of these men in each county than the people at home?"58
A black delegate from Dinwiddie County, A. W. Harris, led the op-
position to the proposed changes, protesting that "we want the school
laws to remain as they now are," and that the Democratic bill "takes
the matter further from the people than ever before. '59
It is essential to note that under current conditions the 1877 law
providing for local appointment of school boards would not have
given the Democrats the control they sought. In cities such as Peters-
burg, where the council was still under Readjuster control, and in
counties with Readjuster or Republican judges, commonwealth attor-
neys, or school superintendents, the local trustee electoral boards
could still name board members sympathetic to black education, and
in black-majority counties might even name blacks as school trust-
ees.60 As a result, there appears to be an ulterior motive to this altera-
tion of the 1877 law. Indeed, it is reasonable to infer that legislative
appointment of local school board selection commissions was
designed, to a significant degree, to achieve a partisan and racial
purpose.6
1
This inference is reinforced by the fact that the 1884 legislature,
now controlled by a Democratic majority, adopted another law
designed to solidify white control, the Anderson-McCormick election
law.62 This law gave election judges great discretion in the counting of
ballots, which led to extensive fraud by Democratic election officials
57. Act of Feb. 20, 1884, ch. 138, 1884 Va. Acts 177.
58. PEOPLE (Harrisonburg), reprinted in WHIG (Richmond), Feb. 21, 1884.
59. Wino (Richmond), Jan. 12, 1884.
60. See PIERSON, supra note 51, at 167; Morton, supra note 47, at 123.
61. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 21-22 (McCrary testimony). According to Professor
Stewart, however, the shift to legislative appointment of school board members resulted merely
from "a power struggle between readjusters and democrats." Id. at 244-45. In his view, "the
issue was not one of race connected to school board election on the part of members of the state
legislature." Id. Perhaps here is an appropriate point to note that expert witnesses have no
control over the accuracy of court reporters. In this instance, the transcript records Professor
Stewart as testifying that Dr. McCrary, rather than (as he actually said) J. L. M. Curry, made
racially discriminatory comments about the school board appointment issue in 1884. Id.
62. WYNES, supra note 43, at 39-40.
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in the years ahead.63 "The Anderson-McCormick bill was passed in
the interest of the white people of Virginia," the Richmond Times Dis-
patch announced frankly.64 "It is a white man's law. It operates to
perpetuate the rule of the white man in Virginia. '65
D. Return to Appointment by Local Commissions, 1887 - 1903
Once the Democrats consolidated their power throughout the
state, they returned the authority to appoint district school trustees to
the local counties. An 1887 law re-established the appointment proce-
dure originally put into place for racially discriminatory purposes ten
years earlier: under this statute the county judge, commonwealth's at-
torney, and school superintendent served as a school trustee electoral
board.66 This sequence of events leaves little doubt that this law, like
the 1877 statute it replicated, was racially motivated. 67 Yet, neither
court in Irby took a position on whether the 1887 statute was designed
to prevent the selection of black school board members. The local
appointing board remained unaltered until 1903. According to a re-
cent study of Virginia local schools, all the school board members se-
lected under this system were white.68 Moreover, by the turn of the
century, predictably, per-pupil expenditures were twice as high for
white as for black schools.69
63. KOUSSER, supra note 47, at 172. Kousser quotes long-time Democratic machine leader
Hal Flood, who recalled that the law allowed Democratic election judges, after the polls were
closed,
to turn everyone out of the election room until they had an opportunity to make the
number of ballots in the ballot box tally with the number of names on the poll book. In
the black counties this enabled them to change the ballots to suit themselves. Iis was
done in many instances to save those counties from Negro domination.
Id. Woodward quotes the recollection of another prominent Democrat: "They thereupon deter-
mined that they would never run the risk of falling under [Nlegro domination again, and they
accordingly amended the election laws so that the officers of election, if so inclined, could stuff
the ballot boxes and cause them to make any returns that were desired." WooDwARD, supra
note 48, at 105.
64. RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, quoted in WYNrs, supra note 43, at 40.
65. Id. According to Andrew Buni, the bill's architect, Delegate William A. Anderson, was
a "white supremacist" who subsequently played a key role in defending disfranchisement in his
capacity as state attorney general from 1902 to 1910. ANDRaw BUNi, Tim NEGRO IN VIRGINIA
POrIcs, 1902-1965, at 7 (1967).
66. Act of May 14, 1887, ch. 233, 1887 Va. Acts 305 (Ex. Sess,), follows the provisions set
forth in Act of Jan. 11, 1877, ch. 12, 1877 Va. Acts 9.
67. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 23-24 (McCrary testimony). Neither court addressed
the issue of racial purpose in connection with the 1887 statute. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp.
424 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
68. LINK, supra note 44, at 39-40, 234.
69. Louis R. HARLAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PUBLIC SCHOOL CAMPAIGNS AND RA-
CISM IN THE SouTrHm SEABOARD STATES, 1901-1915, at 140 (1958).
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III. THE DEBATE OVER ELECTED SCHOOL BOARDS AT THE
DISFRANCHISING CONVENTION, 1901 - 1902
Despite the evidence presented by the plaintiffs and reviewed in
the preceding pages, neither court in Irby ruled on the merits of the
plaintiffs' claim that Virginia adopted and maintained the system of
school board appointments by local selection commissions for racially
discriminatory purposes between 1877 and 1902. Any doubts were re-
solved, however, by the debates at the Virginia Constitutional Con-
vention of 1901-1902. All historians agree that a major purpose of the
literacy test and the poll tax requirement adopted by the 1902 conven-
tion was to disfranchise most of the state's black citizens.70 At the
same time, the convention considered, but, after much discussion, re-
jected the idea of requiring popular election of school trustees. 71 Dur-
ing the debate over appointed school boards, delegates expressed
their racial intent as openly as when discussing the poll tax or literacy
requirements, but this debate has gone virtually unexamined.
72
While the disfranchising measures were still under debate, the
committee on education recommended an amendment that would
have replaced the local trustee selection boards with a system of popu-
lar elections: "[i]n each school district there shall be elected by the
people three school trustees, whose term of office shall be four
years."73 According to a member of the committee from Northern
Virginia, J. B. T. Thornton of Prince William County, he and his col-
leagues had assumed that this provision "would not be passed upon in
Convention until the question of franchise had been settled. '74 After
delegates on the floor convinced him that disfranchisement might not
be immediately implemented, Thornton supported an amendment
which left the choice in the hands of the legislature, stating that
70. KOUSSER, supra note 47, at 176-80; RALPH C. MCDANEL, THE VIRGINIA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1901-1902, at 24 (1928); BuNi, supra note 65, at 16. On this point, at
least, both experts in Irby v. Fitz-hugh agreed. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 24-29 (Mc-
Crary testimony), 246-48 (Stewart testimony). Indeed, who could doubt a goal so openly es-
poused. Carter Glass of Lynchburg, the anti-machine "reformer" who was a driving force
behind disfranchisement, was merely its most colorful defender when he declared that the con-
vention's purpose was "to discriminate to the very extremity of permissible action under the
limitations of the Federal Constitution with the view to the elimination of every [N]egro who can
be gotten rid of, legally, without materially impairing the strength of the white electorate." 2
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE OF
VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) [hereinafter 2 REPORT].
71. 2 REPORT, supra note 70, at 1828-30.
72. The single exception is legal scholar A. E. Dick Howard. See 2 A.E. DICK HoWARD,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 934 (1974).
73. 2 REPORT, supra note 70, at 1828.
74. Id.
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"[t]here are a number of counties in the State in which we will have
[N]egro trustees" if the new constitution were to require elected
school boards. Thornton further declared: "That is a condition of af-
fairs that is abhorrent."75 D. Q. Eggleston of black-majority Charlotte
County also urged the retention of the appointive system because "as
the matter now stands, we would not only be liable, but likely, to have
[N]egro school trustees in a good many districts in the State, if the
trustees are to be elected by the people. '76 The only delegate to
openly object was John C. Summers, a Republican delegate from
Washington County in the mountains of southwest Virginia. Eventu-
ally, the convention eliminated the provision for popular election of
school trustees by a vote of 58 to 25.77 Faced with such overwhelming
evidence, both Judge Williams and the appeals court ruled that the
1902 decision to maintain appointed school boards was motivated by
the specific purpose of preventing blacks from serving on school
boards.78
IV. APPOINTIVE SCHOOL BOARDS AFTER DISFRANCHISEMENT,
1903 - 1946
A. Implementation of the Convention's Racial
Purpose in 1903
In 1903, the General Assembly reenacted the appointive system
for local school boards, pursuant to the requirements of the new con-
stitution. For municipalities, the system remained as it had been-the
city and town councils appointed school trustees.79 The appointive
procedures used for county school boards were altered, however, in
one minor respect. Instead of serving on the trustee electoral board
himself, the circuit judge would appoint a "resident qualified voter" to
serve with the commonwealth's attorney and the school superinten-
dent.80 The plaintiffs' expert in Irby inferred that the General Assem-
bly was merely implementing the same invidious racial purpose
expressed by convention delegates in 1902.81 Judge Williams ruled,
75. Id. at 1829.
76. Id. at 1830.
77. Id.
78. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424, 428, 432-33 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1354, 1356 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
906 (1990). Both experts also agreed. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 26-29 (McCrary testi-
mony), 256 (Stewart testimony).
79. Act of Dec. 31, 1903, ch. 512, 1903 Va. Acts 825, Sec. 1528.
80. Act of Dec. 28, 1903, ch. 509, 1903 Va. Acts 798, Sec. 1450.
81. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 29-30 (McCrary testimony).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
however, that such an inference required proof of discriminatory in-
tent.82 In light of the disfranchisement of blacks by the 1902 Constitu-
tion, Judge Williams believed, even an elective system "would have
completely excluded blacks from school board participation.
'83
The judge's ruling assumes that legislators in 1903 were sure that
disfranchisement was immune to reversal by the federal courts. At
that point in time, however, two lawsuits challenging the constitution-
ality of the disfranchising mechanisms put in place by the 1902 con-
vention were on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.84 In
both cases, the lead counsel was Virginia expatriate John S. Wise, an
ardent Republican member of the Readjuster coalition who became a
prominent New York lawyer after leaving the state in the 1880s. In
1904, the Supreme Court ruled in the state's favor, assuring that most
blacks would be disfranchised for the foreseeable future, but the Vir-
ginia General Assembly, not having the advantage of hindsight pos-
sessed by the trial judge in 1988, could not have predicted that
outcome with confidence in 1903.85
Maintenance of the appointive system assured continued white
domination; of course, as long as blacks were completely dis-
franchised, elected school boards would have provided the same as-
surance. White dominance, in turn, produced disparate funding for
the education of black children.86 Official state data for the year 1917-
1918 illustrate the disparity for the five defendant jurisdictions in the
Virginia school board case. In Nottoway County, the expenditure for
white pupils averaged $16.03, while the average for blacks was $4.19.
For Buckingham County, the expenditure for whites was $13.22 but
82. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 433. The court observed that "[t]he plaintiffs have not
proven, however, that the 1903 General Assembly modification and retention of the appointive
scheme was done for racially discriminatory reasons." Id. "Although the act was passed at a
time when a white supremacy movement was sweeping the post-Reconstruction South," Judge
Williams added, "there is nothing in the record to suggest that the decision to continue to ap-
point school trustees was tainted by this racial animus." Id.
83. The appeals court, which had the responsibility for identifying errors in the trial court's
assessment of the burden of proof, never referred to the 1903 act. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989).
84. Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904); Selden v. Montague, 194 U.S. 154 (1904).
85. See Jones v. Montague, 194 U.S. 147 (1904). On these cases and the uncertainty regard-
ing possible challenges to disfranchisement in Virginia, see Buni, supra note 65, at 34-46; ALLEN
W. MOGER, VIRGINIA: BoUBONISM TO BYRD, 1870-1925, at 201-02 (1968).
86. MOGER, supra note 85, at 257. Moger paints a bleak picture for the early 20th century,
just as the state's "progressive" leaders expanded public funding for education, citing an annual
per-pupil expenditure for white children of $12.84 and for each black child of $5.60. Id. In seven
Southside or Tidewater counties where two-thirds of the public school enrollment was black,
Moger reports that "expenditures in 1915 for salaries of white teachers were nine times those of
Negro teachers." Id. One of these counties spent $12.37 per pupil in the white schools for every
dollar spent on black pupils. Id.
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only $3.56 for blacks. Prince Edward County spent $21.64 for white
students but only $4.37 for black pupils. In Halifax County, the
figures were $12.45 for whites and $3.12 for black. Finally, the City of
Petersburg spent $20.03 per white student but only $6.53 per black
student.87 Such racial disparities declined only with the success of
lawsuits brought by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund during the 1930s
and 1940s against the state which sought to defend its dual school sys-
tem against the charge that segregation was inherently
discriminatory.88
B. Local Selection Commissions as a Bulwark of
Machine Rule
The racially restricted electorate achieved through the 1902 con-
stitution was a key ingredient in the success of the political machine
that dominated Virginia politics for more than six decades, first under
the leadership of United States Senator Thomas S. Martin, and then
under Governor and United States Senator Harry F. Byrd.89 Accord-
ing to historian Louis R. Harlan, the appointed school board facili-
tated the machine's control over local affairs: "The county school
trustee electoral board, which had the real power over school admini-
stration, was securely controlled by local officeholders chosen by
county conventions. '"90
C. Proposals for Elected School Boards, 1920 - 1930
In those days, no one argued that the appointive system was free
of political influence or that it promoted the interests of the public
schools more effectively than would be true of elected school boards.
Even educational reformers urged the state on several occasions in
the 1920s to eliminate the appointive system in favor of elected school
boards. As one commission reported to the legislature in 1920, "it
87. 1 VIRGINIA EDUCATION COMMISSION, VIRGINIA PUBLIC ScHooLs: A SURVEY OF A
SOUTHERN STATE PUBLIC SCHOOL SysTEm 393-96 (1920).
88. HARRY S. AsHm o. THE NEGRO AND THE ScHooLs 60-65, 147 (1954); RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTIcE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 134, 197-99, 215-16, 256 (1975).
89. KOUSSER, supra note 47, at 179-81; V.0. KEY, JR., SouTmERN POLITICS IN STATE AND
NATION 20 (1949); J. HARVIE WILKNSON, HARRY BYRD AND THE CHANGING FACE OF VIR-
GINIA PoLITcs, 1945-1966, at 5, 20, 37-38 (1968).
90. HARLAN, supra note 69, at 137. "The county superintendent was also chosen by the
machine," according to Harlan. Id. "Nominated at the county Democratic convention, ap-
pointed by a state board of education composed of statehouse officials, and confirmed by the
senate," the county superintendents were controlled by the Democratic machine "even in Re-
publican counties." Id. See additionally KEY, supra note 89, at 21-22; WILKINSON, supra note 89,
at 33-34.
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would be hard to invent a more unsatisfactory plan of local control
than the one in vogue in Virginia." 91 Those advocating a shift to a
system of popular elections did not, however, intend to provide the
possibility of black representation on school boards. Blacks were ex-
cluded from the white primary operated by the state's Democratic
Party, and few undertook the rigorous process of trying to register for
the meaningless general elections of the period.92 Instead, these edu-
cational reformers were advocating school board elections for white
voters only.
Despite these recommendations, the General Assembly refused
to adopt a popular election system. It did, however, modify the ap-
pointive procedure. Under the terms of a 1926 law, none of the mem-
bers of the trustee electoral boards were to be public officials.
Instead, the circuit judge would appoint all three members.93 But, be-
cause in Virginia the General Assembly appoints all circuit judges,
selection of school board members remained firmly under the control
of the Byrd machine. Under this "tortuous, winding process of selec-
tion," as political scientist Wylie Kilpatrick put it, "the electorate is
stripped of every measure of control over a large group of county
officials." 94
V. AN ELECTED SCHOOL BOARD IN THE AGE OF MASSIVE
RESISTANCE
Only one county in the state was ever allowed to go to a system
of popular elections. In 1947, the General Assembly enacted a statute
authorizing a referendum in Arlington County, which already em-
ployed a unique county manager form of government with the county
supervisors elected at large, rather than by districts.95 A substantial
91. VIRGINIA EDUCATION COMMISSION, supra note 87, at 20. Three subsequent commis-
sions in the 1920s also proposed elimination of the appointive system in favor of popularly
elected school boards, but the legislature ignored their recommendations. See Irving S. Driscoll,
Jr., The Evolution of School Boards in Virginia - 1810-1972: A Study of State-Local Interaction
180-84 (1979) (unpublished D.Ed. dissertation, University of Virginia).
92. BuNi, supra note 65, at 61-62, 79-80, 117, 120. Despite the fact that blacks were not able
to participate in Democratic primary elections in this period, the state's expert inexplicably at-
tached significance to the fact that electing county school board members would have required
the use of the same single-member districts under which county supervisors were elected, "which
I would think would enhance the possibilities of blacks being elected." Trial transcript I, supra
note 45, at 249 (Stewart testimony).
93. Act of March 6, 1926, ch. 106, 1926 Va. Acts 104.
94. WYLIE KILPATRICK, PROBLEMS IN CONTEMPORARY COUNTY GOVERNMENT: AN EXAM-
INATION OF THE PROCESS OF COUNTY ADMINISTRATION IN VIRGINIA 369 (1930). Kilpatrick
predicted hopefully that "direct election of the school board will cut away the most inexcusable
tangle of indirection now obtaining." Id. at 384.
95. Act of Jan. 30, 1947, ch. 61, 1947 Va. Acts 113.
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majority voted in favor of popular elections in the referendum, and
the five-person school board was thereafter elected at large in non-
partisan elections. In 1956, however, the General Assembly abolished
Arlington's popularly elected school board and returned the county to
the restrictions of the appointive process.96
This decision, which was designed to punish Arlington for its fail-
ure to fight a federal court order to admit black students to its schools,
was among the first legislative steps in the Byrd machine's program of
"massive resistance" to court-ordered school desegregation in the af-
termath of Brown v. Board of Education.97 When the NAACP filed a
lawsuit, the federal court ordered the Arlington County School Board
to come up with a desegregation plan.98 On January 14, 1956, expres-
sing its willingness to obey the law of the land, the board voted unani-
mously to do so.99 Legislators in Richmond referred to the board's
decision as an act of defiance toward the state's massive resistance
policy, and were determined to punish Arlington. 100 In a gross viola-
tion of the local courtesy rule, not one of the 36 co-sponsors of the bill
to abolish Arlington's elected school board were from Arlington, or
even from northern Virginia.' 0' This process was justifiable, con-
tended the bill's sponsor, because the Arlington School Board had
adopted "certain so-called educational procedures that are repulsive
to the conceptions of a great many of the good people of the
county."'1 2
96. Act of Mar. 31, 1956, ch. 591, 1956 Va. Acts 949. The bill was the handiwork of machine
stalwart Frank Moncure. A Denial of Local Option, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 1956,
at 16; ROBBINS L. GATES, THE MAKING OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: VIRGINIA'S POLITICS OF PUB-
LIC SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, 1954-1956, at 124-25 (1962).
97. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). During its deliberations over the bill eliminating Arlington's
elected school board, the General Assembly adopted a resolution favoring "interposition" and
"nullification" of the Supreme Court's desegregation decision. BuNi, supra note 65, at 184. See
generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD ORGANIZA-
TION AND THE PoLITics OF MASSrvE RESISTANCE (1976).
98. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424, 428 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
99. Arlington School Board Adopts Integration Plan, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1956, at 1.
100. Bill Would Stop Arlington Funds, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1956, at 1.
101. Bill Would Abolish Elected Board, WASH. STAR, Jan. 30, 1956, at lB. On the other
hand, among the sponsors was a legislator who was to play a significant role in future battles
over elected school boards, Delegate Sam Pope of Southampton County. Id.
102. Id. Shortly after the school board's decision, Delegate John Boatwright of Buckingham
County, which was 43 percent black in 1950, introduced a bill that would deny school funds to
any school system that cooperated with court-ordered desegregation; the bill would, he said, "tie
up the Arlington crowd, which seems to favor integration." Bill Would Stop Arlington Funds,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1956, at 12. Other delegates specifically mentioned their distaste for the
board's willingness to comply with the desegregation order as the basis for the legislation. Ar-
lington Board Hit By Bill in Assembly, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1956, at 16.
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Not surprisingly, the Arlington County legislative delegation an-
nounced its unanimous opposition to the bill, as did the school board.
The Arlington County P.T.A. sent a letter to every member of the
General Assembly opposing its interference in local affairs. 10 3 Addi-
tionally, several hundred citizens journeyed to the state capitol to
demonstrate their support for an elected school board.1°4 The Rich-
mond Times Dispatch, which generally supported massive resistance,
declared that the Arlington bill was "an unjustifiable interference with
local self-government," and added that "[e]ven if this is legal, which is
debatable, it is indefensible."' 1 5 Ultimately, the segregationist forces
offered a compromise, which the Arlington delegation felt it had to
accept. Rather than return to a trustee selection committee, the dele-
gation agreed to the appointment of school board members by the
county supervisors, with the present elected school board serving out
its full term of office.106 The massive resistance forces were content
with this option because, as a result of a racially charged campaign, an
ardent segregationist majority had recently gained control of the
county board of supervisors. 0 7
Although these events in Arlington County convincingly show
the level of racially motivated activity taking place throughout Vir-
ginia, this evidence did not convince the court in Irby. While conced-
ing that the elimination of Arlington's elected school board was
racially motivated, Judge Williams ruled that the evidence could only
be applied to that county alone because no other locality had an
elected school board at the time.108 Judge Williams ignored evidence
demonstrating that the statute eliminating Arlington's elected school
board also, however, contained a provision explicitly prohibiting the
103. Arlington Board Hit By Bill in Assembly, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1956, at 16; Bill Would
Abolish Elected Board, WASH. STAR, Jan. 30, 1956, at lB.
104. Board Issue in Arlington Stirs Battle At Capita WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1956, at 1;
Moncure Bill is Debated At Crowded Va Hearing, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1956, at 1.
105. A Denial of Local Option, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 1956, at 16. For similar
views, see Squeeze on Arlington, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1956, at 12.
106. GATES, supra note 96, at 125.
107. BENJAMIN MUSE, VIRGINIA'S MASsIVE RESISTANCE 24 (1961). The segregationist
county supervisors, not surprisingly, voted to support the bill returning Arlington to the appoin-
tive system. Arlington's Board Favors Moncure Bill, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 7, 1956,
at 1.
108. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424, 433 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990). The 1956
decision "created a cause of action unique to Arlington," the court ruled. Id. at 433. "No other
county, including the named defendants, was affected by that decision, nor were the named
plaintiffs affected by this intentional racially discriminatory act." I&
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use of elected boards in any other county of the state.1 9 The historian
testifying for the plaintiffs interpreted this explicit statewide prohibi-
tion as a reflection of "a more general intention to maintain white
control," but the judge dismissed the clause as a mere "redun-
dancy." 110 The appeals court, however, agreed with the plaintiffs'
expert."'
VI. Ti 1968 DECISION TO MAINTAIN TRUSTEE SELECTION
BOARDS
In the years following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, legislators from time to time introduced bills designed to allow
popular election of school boards - yet each failed to pass. The
most open debate occurred in 1968, when delegates from counties
with small black populations introduced several bills authorizing vot-
ers, through a local referendum, to eliminate the appointive system in
favor of popular elections. Opposition to these bills was concentrated,
according to press accounts, in "rural counties with heavy concentra-
tions of Negro citizens.""
2
Delegate Donald Pendleton of mountainous Amherst County, a
veteran "moderate" opponent of the Byrd machine, introduced a bill
providing voters with a choice between popular election, appointment
by the county governing body, or a continuation of the school trustee
electoral boards." 3 A subcommittee of the House Education Com-
mittee, however, revised the bill to eliminate the option of popular
election. Julian Mason of Caroline, a heavily black rural county, said
the subcommittee "couldn't go along with direct election for fear the
school boards would become too embroiled in politics.""H4 Commit-
tee chairman Sam Pope, a veteran segregationist from Southhampton,
an old plantation county, complained that "such an option 'will wreck
our situation' in eastern Virginia counties," because "there are
109. Act of Mar. 31, 1956, ch. 591, 1956 Va. Acts 549-550 ("Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, general or special, no school board shall be elected by popular vote in and for any
county or city").
110. See Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 33-35 (colloquy between McCrary and Judge
Williams).
111. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d at 1356.
112. School Board Selection Bill Killed By Senate, RIcHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 1968,
at 2A.
113. H.R. No. 12, §§ 22-79.3 - 22-79.5, Jan. 11, 1968 (Virginia State Legislature); Bills Affect-
ing Education Move Ahead in Legislature, DANVILLE REGISTER, Feb. 16, 1968, at 2.
114. Id.
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thousands of voters in my county who can't read and write and yet
they are qualified voters." 115
The Irby plaintiffs were once again unsuccessful in conveying to
the court the importance of these debates, which clearly displaying
racial intent. The plaintiffs' expert interpreted Pope's comment as an
expression of racial intent, in part because of Pope's conservative ra-
cial views on other issues. As a result, he concluded that the commit-
tee's decision to kill the proposal for elected school boards was
racially motivated.116 The courts, however, ignored this view and the
undisputed evidence of racial purpose the debates displayed." 7
VII. Ti PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION, 1969 - 1971
In 1968, the state established a commission to propose changes in
the Virginia constitution. The commission recommended numerous
changes in the constitution designed to eliminate the vestiges of mas-
sive resistance in the education article, but it neither discussed the is-
115. Id. The specific content of Pope's remark implied a racial reference because the 1965
Voting Rights Act had enfranchised large numbers of blacks by outlawing literacy tests, on the
grounds that Southern registrars operated such tests in a racially discriminatory manner. In
Southhampton, an old plantation county, Pope's reference to illiterate voters would have been
understood as referring to blacks. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 38-39 (McCrary
testimony).
116. Pope was one of the sponsors of the racially motivated 1956 bill eliminating elected
school boards for Arlington County. Bill Would Abolish Elected Board, WASH. STAR, Jan. 30,
1956, at lB. During the 1959 debate over the use of tuition grants to promote segregated pri-
vate schools facing federal court orders, Pope declared: "I'm hoping the availability of tuition
grants will cause these people in Norfolk and other places to pull their children out of mixed
schools," adding that "if anybody could come up with anything which would prevent integration,
I would go along with it." First Reaction of Lawmakers is Favorable, RicHoMND TImEs DiS-
PATCH, Jan. 29, 1959, at 1, 4. As late as 1969, when the House of Delegates was debating revision
of the state constitution's article on education, Pope was still defending tuition grants, although
he conceded that federal court orders had eliminated the possibility of using them to promote
segregation. "I am not arguing the segregation issue, that is a dead issue so far as I am con-
cerned. We have been sacrificed on the block in the southeastern part of Virginia [where the
most heavily black counties were located]." Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia House of
Delegates Pertaining to Amendment of the Constitution (Ex. Sess. 1969, Reg. Sess. 1970) (Mar. 28,
1969) 299 [hereinafter Proceedings]. Pope went on to lament that pupils were no longer allowed
to sing tunes such as "Old Black Joe" or read "Little Black Sambo," which he characterized as
"the story that did more than anything else to bring white and colored children to play together
and to love each other." Id. The plaintiffs' expert read Pope's remarks into the record to illus-
trate Pope's racial views. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 56 (McCrary testimony). Id.
117. In voting rights cases, trial courts are required to make detailed findings of fact as well
as conclusions of law. The state did not dispute my testimony on the 1968 decision. Trial tran-
script I, supra note 45, at 76-110 (McCrary cross-examination). Furthermore, the state's expert,
Professor Stewart, did not testify concerning maintenance of appointed school boards after
World War II. In fact, the trial court did not address the 1968 evidence at all. Nor, despite the
plaintiffs' effort to flag the issue, did the appellate court. Brief of Appellants at 25-26, Irby v.
Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. Va. 1988) (No. 88-2919) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants], affd
sub nom. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989).
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sue of school board selection nor altered the appointive system.118
When the General Assembly sat as a constitutional convention in
1969, it eliminated many laws adopted during the 1950s that promoted
segregation but had since been struck down by the federal courts.
Yet, the legislature rejected any change in the 1902 provision leaving
school board selection to the discretion of the legislature." 9
The subject of appointed school boards came up in debate only
once. Republican moderate Ted Dalton of Radford, who had coura-
geously opposed the Byrd machine's "massive resistance" program in
his unsuccessful 1957 gubernatorial campaign, introduced an amend-
ment which would have eliminated the traditional trustee selection
commissions and entrusted the appointment of school boards to
county boards of supervisors, even if not to the voters. 20 Delegate
Sam Pope spoke against Dalton's amendment, and once again the leg-
islature refused to alter the status quo.' 2'
As was true with the evidence of Arlington County, the trial
court in Irby ignored this evidence of racial intent.' 22 In light of
Pope's segregationist racial views, discussed above, the plaintiffs' ex-
pert inferred that the decision to kill Dalton's amendment was racially
motivated. 123 But the state argued, and the trial court eventually
ruled, that by leaving the issue of school board selection to the discre-
tion of the General Assembly, albeit without discussion, the state
118. TmE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL
REVISION 2-3, 268,485 (1969). The commission's executive director, Professor A. E. Dick How-
ard of the University of Virginia Law School, testified at trial that he set forth for the committee
the numerous ways in which the constitution was infected with racially discriminatory provisions
designed to promote segregation and disfranchisement, so that these provisions could be rooted
out. Yet, he did not recall that he, or anyone else, mentioned the issue of appointed school
boards. At trial, Howard did not recall whether at that time he was aware of the evidence
concerning the 1902 debates. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 386-94 (Howard testimony).
Subsequently, however, Howard published a treatise in which he found the decision to maintain
appointive school boards in 1902 to have been racially motivated. 2 HOWARD, supra note 72, at
934.
119. On the revision process generally, see Hullihen W. Moore, In Aid of Public Education:
An Analysis of the Education Article of the Virginia Constitution of 1971, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 263
(1971).
120. Proceedings, supra note 116, at 299.
121. Id.
122. Judge Williams found "no evidence that the means of selecting school boards was
tainted by racial considerations." Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424, 429 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd
sub nom. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 906 (1990). In his view, "[mIembers simply could not agree on which method was the best
and put the debate off to another day by agreeing to preserve the flexibility that currently ex-
isted." Id. at 429.
123. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 55-56 (McCrary testimony).
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purged itself of past discriminatory intent.124 As also was true with
the Arlington County evidence, however, the appeals court concurred
with the plaintiffs' expert and disagreed with the trial court.
"Although the 1971 constitution wrought dramatic (and racially pro-
gressive) changes in other areas pertaining to education," the court
stated, "one cannot readily assume that such breaks with the past car-
ried over to the school board selection provision which was retained
without change and virtually without debate.' 125
VIII. FURTHER UNDISPUTED PROOF OF RACIAL PURPOSE:
THE CASE OF SURRY COUNTY, 1971 - 1973
The plaintiffs' expert cited the expansive of Surry County as an-
other example of the extent to which, during the 1970s, the appointive
system was consciously used to minimize black service on school
boards. In Surry County, a black-majority county in southside Vir-
ginia, the trustee electoral board was used, according to historian
James W. Ely, to perpetuate white control of the school system. 26
Surry, an old tobacco county, was among the poorest in the nation and
suffered a declining population. 27 After the first seven black students
were admitted to the one white school in the county in 1963, whites
formed a private "segregation academy" to which all the white stu-
dents and all the white teachers moved. The all-white school board
then closed the former white school and reduced the appropriation of
school funds.128 Additionally,, as late as 1971 whites held all the im-
portant positions in the county government and all but one of the
seats on the school board that presided over an all-black public educa-
tional system. 129
In November, 1971, however, blacks won three of the five seats
on the county board of supervisors, which are elected, as in virtually
124. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 433. "The Constitutional Revision Commission ad-
dressed directly the policies of massive resistance and purged them from the educational sys-
tem," the court observed. "Article VII of the Constitution affirms this commitment." Id. Yet
even here, where the burden of proof rested squarely with the state, Judge Williams placed the
burden on the plaintiffs, emphasizing that in the legislative debates "there is no evidence that the
means of selecting school boards was tainted by racial considerations," and concluded that "the
state has met its burden of proof in demonstrating that at least since 1971 the system has not
been maintained for racially discriminatory reasons." Id. at 429, 433.
125. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1989).
126. ELY, supra note 97, at 199-201. For an additional account of the Surry experience, see
NEAL R. PEIRCE, THE BORDER SOUTH STATES: PEOPLE, PoLrrCS, AND POWER IN THE FIVE
BORDER SOUTH STATES 96 (1975).
127. ELY, supra note 97, at 199-201.
128. Id. Pettaway v. County Sch. Bd. of Surry County, 332 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1964).
129. ELY, supra note 97, at 199-200; PEmcE, supra note 126, at 96.
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all Virginia counties, by single-member districts.130 Campaigning
largely on a pledge to improve the school system blacks succeeded in
making Surry the first Virginia county since Reconstruction with a
black majority on the county board.13' The trustee selection board,
however, stood squarely in the path of that campaign pledge. 132 As a
result, predicted the Richmond Times Dispatch, "for the time being, at
least, the make-up of the school board will remain in the control of
the county's white power structure - and the blacks will want that
altered.' 33 That prediction proved accurate on both counts.
The circuit judge named one black to the three-person trustee
electoral commission; the commission then named two blacks to an
expanded five-person school board, but turned down the nominations
of the only black member of the electoral commission and appointed
blacks that were favored by the white majority.134 In response, the
black community petitioned successfully for a referendum election on
changing the form of appointment, taking advantage of a 1970 statute
allowing voters to choose between the traditional trustee appointing
commission and selection by the county board of supervisors. The lo-
cal paper, the Sussex-Surry Dispatch commented that "[i]f the change
is voted in, presumably the School Board eventually would have a Ne-
gro majority.' 35
The paper's editorial comments just before the referendum of-
fered the standard justification of the status quo: "under the present
system of appointment, the School Board is far removed from political
pressures.' 36 The paper conceded that the alternative of appoint-
ment by the local governing body might seem, in principle, a good
idea, but added that "a voter in Surry County has a right to consider
whether (1) a more 'democratic' method is really needed and (2) such
a change, which might otherwise be a good thing, is desirable at a
particular time and under particular circumstances.' 37 The circum-
stance that seemed to matter most to the paper's editor was that a
130. ELY, supra note 97, at 200.
131. Id.
132. ELY, supra note 97, at 200; Peirce, supra note 126, at 96.
133. The New Mood, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Nov. 14, 1971. "Surry is a one-issue
county, and on that issue the school board will be the real seat of power." Id.
134. Surry School Board Includes Two Negroes, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Dec. 14, 1971, at
4; 2 Negroes, 3 Whites on Surry School Board, SussEx-SuRRY DISPATCH, Dec. 16, 1971, at 1.
135. Surry to Vote May 2 on Trustee Selection, SUSSEx-SURRY DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 1972, at 1.
The statute allowing the referendum is Act of Mar. 19, 1970, ch. 126, 1970 Va. Acts 176.
136. A Crucial Decision, SUSSEX-SuRRY DISPATCH, Apr. 27, 1972.
137. Id.
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black majority controlled the county governing body: "Let's face it:
On the surface, the situation has boiled down to a racial matter. '138
By a narrow margin the supporters of the existing appointment
system prevailed in a referendum characterized by racially polarized
voting. As a result, in 1973 the trustee electoral board was able to
maintain white control by a three to two margin. Thus, white parents
sent their children to private academies, for the most part, and the
white-majority school board controlled the operation of the mostly
black public schools.139 Testifying to these events in court, the plain-
tiffs' expert in Irby cited the Surry experience, along with that of sev-
eral other counties in the 1970s and 1980s, as evidence that Virginia's
appointive system was retained for a racially discriminatory purpose
and had the desired effect. 40 Neither court, however, noted this evi-
dence of ongoing discriminatory intent in the operation of the appoin-
tive system at the local level. Consequently, like the other county
specific evidence presented, the events of Surry County failed to per-
suade the court that there was a statewide intention to maintain white
control on the school boards.
IX. THE 1984 DECISION TO MAINTAIN THE APPOINTIVE SYSTEM
As late as 1981, black representation on school boards was only
12 percent statewide although African Americans constituted 18 per-
cent of the voting age population of Virginia. 14' In 1984, the General
Assembly established an ad hoc subcommittee to investigate the mer-
its of authorizing elected school boards. The subcommittee held a se-
ries of hearings in various parts of the state. Generally, advocates of
elected school boards argued that they are more democratic, more re-
sponsive to the wishes of the public, more effective in mobilizing inter-
est in educational matters, and more independent of the county or city
governing body.142 On the other side, proponents of retaining appoin-
tive school boards argued that "highly qualified citizens who prefer
not to subject themselves to the demands of running for elected office
are willing to serve on an appointed board as a community service."' 4 3
Appointive boards, they continued, "are less likely to inject politics
138. Id.
139. ELY, supra note 97, at 201.
140. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 64-75.
141. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424, 430 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd sub nom. Irby v. Virginia
State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
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and political ambitions into education since they are not seeking re-
election or using the school board as a political stepping stone," and
thus are "more likely to avoid the problem of single-issue cam-
paigns."'144 In the end, the subcommittee recommended modifica-
tions, many of which were subsequently adopted, such as requiring
public hearings before making appointments or requiring that ap-
pointments provide a certain breadth of geographical representation,
but refused to support a change to popular election.14
5
Both plaintiffs and defendants in Irby agreed that neither the ear-
lier racial purposes nor the current racial effects of school board ap-
pointment were raised in these deliberations. According to the
appeals court, this stipulation was dispositive: "the district court did
not clearly err in finding such evidence sufficient to demonstrate a
lack of discriminatory intent in the current maintenance of the ap-
pointive system."'146 As the plaintiffs interpreted the standard, on the
other hand, the state had to show that the subcommittee had weighed
the non-racial justifications for the appointive process against its ra-
cially discriminatory effects in the present. 147 Eventually, the panel
rejected the plaintiffs' argument. But, it is important to note that the
144. Id.
145. 1l The arguments offered in defense of the status quo might be described as elitist, or
even undemocratic, but not as racial in character. Id.
146. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1989).
147. Brief of Appellants, supra note 117, at 33-34. Plaintiffs cited evidence concerning the
legislature's revisions in the constitutional provisions regarding tuition grants to illustrate how
the state could have met this burden. In the days of massive resistance the legislature had re-
vised the constitution to permit tuition grants to individual students who might use them to
attend private schools; the stated purpose at the time was to facilitate resistance to court-ordered
racial integration. See Moore, supra note 119, at 300; ELY, supra note 97, at 45-46, 75-76, 88-89,
124, 157-58. By the time the 1969 legislature debated the issue, federal court decisions had inval-
idated tuition grants when used to frustrate school desegregation. See Griffin v. Bd. of Educ.,
296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969). Also, earlier, tuition grants were disallowed as part of the
elimination of public schools in one southside county. See Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward
County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Before the Commission on Constitutional Revision concluded its
work, the courts also struck down Louisiana's tuition grant program. See Poindexter v. Louisi-
ana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), affd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). Ulti-
mately, the legislature retained the old provision in the 1971 constitution without change.
Legislators recognized, however, that tuition grants could only be used for nondiscriminatory
purposes under current law, and they articulated a non-racial goal: assuring the constitutionality
of state aid used to educate physically or mentally handicapped students in specialized private
programs. Moore, supra note 119, at 299-302. Thus, in the view of the plaintiffs' expert, the state
maintained its tuition grant provision without a racially discriminatory purpose. Trial transcript
I, supra note 45, at 61-62 (McCrary testimony). In a colloquy with plaintiffs' counsel, Judge
Williams, once again misconstruing the burden of proof, indicated that this testimony was not
"probative" if the witness, in his words, "can't testify that it was retained for discriminatory
purposes." Id. at 62-63. The state provided no such affirmative evidence in regard to its decision
to retain appointed school boards in 1984, and thus could not, in the plaintiffs' view, meet its
burden of proof. Brief of Appellants, supra note 117, at 33-34.
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appeals court never discussed what the state's burden actually was
under current Equal Protection jurisprudence.
148
X. How THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT SHOULD HAvE BEEN
APPLIED
In Irby, both the trial court and appellate court misapplied the
Fourteenth Amendment by keeping the burden to prove discrimina-
tory intent on the plaintiffs. Instead, once plaintiffs prove, as they did
here, that racial discrimination is a motivating factor behind enact-
ment of a law,149 the burden shifts to the defendants to prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that they would have taken the action
in the absence of the impermissible motive.' 50 Moreover, the courts
have consistently ruled that the significance of such a finding of dis-
criminatory intent does not dissipate with the mere passage of time.
151
Indeed, the only further requirement under Hunter is proof of a con-
tinuing discriminatory result:
Without deciding whether § 182 [the Alabama petty crimes provi-
sion of 1901] would be valid if enacted today without any impermis-
sible notivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of
race and the section continues to this day to have that effect.'
52
As a result, evidence of discriminatory maintenance is not clearly
required under Hunter v. Underwood. 53 According to the appeals
court, however, the plaintiffs in the Virginia school board case pro-
vided convincing evidence of discriminatory maintenance in connec-
tion with legislative decision in 1956, and the constitutional revision
148. The appeals court cites neither Hunter nor Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), yet observes: "We need not decide whether the Equal Protection
Clause mandates the burden-shifting scheme proposed by the plaintiffs because, even assuming
that the burden shifted to the defendants, they have proved that racial discrimination no longer
motivates Virginia's decision to retain an appointive system for selecting school board mem-
bers." Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d at 1355.
149. Recall that the trial judge found that the 1902 constitutional convention decided to re-
tain the appointed school board system for a racially discriminatory purpose. Irby v. Fitz-hugh,
693 F. Supp. at 432.
150. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228.
151. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973). Justice Brennan remarked
that "remoteness in time certainly does not make those actions any less intentional." Id. In
Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1984), affd sub nom Hunter v. Underwood, 471
U.S. 222 (1985), the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed unanimously by the United
States Supreme Court, struck down the Alabama "petty crimes" provision enacted in 1901, de-
claring that the passage of eight decades could not "render immune a puposefuily discriminatory
scheme whose invidious effects still reverberate today." Underwood, 730 F.2d at 621.
152. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
153. Id at 228, 233.
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process from 1969 to 1971.154 To the extent that the purposes underly-
ing the 1984 decision to maintain the appointive system are relevant,
the logic of the Court's decision in Hunter places the burden of proof
on the defendants. 55 In evaluating the purpose of an official action
under the Equal Protection Clause, courts are required to pay particu-
lar attention when the sequence of events leading to that action in-
cludes a record of official discrimination on account of race. 5 6 The
court's own extensive findings of intentional discrimination in the
maintenance of Virginia's appointive system through 1971 must there-
fore weigh heavily in the balance. In addition, the trial court noted
that as late as 1981 blacks were still significantly underrepresented. 5 7
In light of these circumstances, the fact that race was never discussed
at the time of the 1984 legislative decision hardly meets the test set
down by the Supreme Court. 58
XI. EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING EFFECTS
The appellate panel's assessment of the intent evidence from the
1984 hearings appears to be substantially based on its assessment of
the quantitative evidence concerning the system's current effects at
the time of trial. The parties agreed on the facts concerning the per-
centage of blacks serving on school boards throughout the state, but
disputed how best to interpret them. Very few blacks served on
school boards in 1970, but by 1981, 12 percent of school trustees state-
wide were black. 59 By 1987, the year the case was filed, blacks made
up 18 percent of all school board members in the state; looking only at
the statewide aggregate, therefore, blacks had proportional represen-
tation. 160 Judge Williams gave primary weight to this factor in con-
cluding that the appointive system no longer had a disparate impact
on blacks. 161
154. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1989).
155. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
156. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977). "The his-
torical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of
official actions taken for individious purposes." Id. at 267.
157. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 430. The trial court used statewide aggregate data as
the test of discriminatory effect. Although African Americans made up 18 percent of the voting
age population in Virginia was black, they represented only 12 percent of school board members.
I&
158. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 233.
159. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 430.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 430, 433-34.
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This statewide pattern, however, obscured as much as it revealed.
In many school districts, blacks were under 10 percent of the popula-
tion and unlikely to elect representatives even if fair single-member
district election plans were in place. 162 Furthermore, in the Washing-
ton suburbs of Northern Virginia, in Charlottesville and Albemarle
County, and in some Tidewater jurisdictions, blacks were significantly
overrepresented on school boards. In twenty-six counties and four cit-
ies, on the other hand, blacks were underrepresented by at least one
seat.16
3
"The proper comparison," contended the appeals court, "must fo-
cus not on the statewide averages but rather on the figures for the five
local jurisdictions at issue."' 164 All reflected substantial under-
representation of blacks: Buckingham County, 42 percent black, had a
school board that was only 14 percent black; in 40 percent black Hali-
fax County, 22 percent of school trustees were black; in Nottoway
County, 37 percent black, the school board was 20 percent black;
Prince Edward County, 37 percent black, had a school board that was
25 percent black; finally, the city of Petersburg, was 61 percent black
and blacks made up only 44 percent of its school trustees.165 Yet, in
the view of the appeals court, these disparities were not substantial
enough to conclude that the appointive scheme continued to operate
with a discriminatory effect. 66
The plaintiffs argued that, under existing case law, once they
proved intent they were required only to prove that the appointive
system continues to have some discriminatory effect. 167 In addition to
the evidence cited by the appeals court, plaintiffs pointed to large
numbers of counties in which blacks were significantly under-
represented on appointed school boards. 168 They also emphasized
that the appointment process was still overwhelmingly controlled by
162. See id. at 430-31. Thus, any black appointments would represent greater than propor-
tional representation.
163. Id. at 424, 430.
164. Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d at 1358.
165. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 430. According to the appeals court, however, "the
defendants produced expert testimony discounting the statistical significance of the figures in the
defendant jurisdictions." Irby v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d at 1358. Actually, the
witness questioned the statistical significance of the underrepresentation in the state as a whole,
not the seven individual jurisdictions. Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 348, 350, 354 (Rebecca
Klemm testimony).
166. Irby v. Fitz-hugh, 693 F. Supp. at 430.
167. In the Alabama petty crimes case, for example, the courts were content with evidence
that in the two counties in which plaintiffs resided blacks were at least 1.7 times as likely as
whites to suffer disfranchisement under the petty crimes provision. Underwood, 730 F.2d at 620.
168. Brief of Appellants, supra note 117, at 13-17.
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white trustee selection commissioners, county supervisors, or city
council members. 169 Under prevailing case law, such evidence of con-
tinuing effect should have been enough to meet this burden.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the historical evidence of discriminatory intent in the op-
eration of Virginia's appointive school boards over the century follow-
ing adoption of local selection boards in 1877 is overwhelming. The
plaintiffs met their burden of proof under the prevailing intent stan-
dard, thus obligating the defendants to prove that a racial purpose no
longer animates the operation of that appointive system. The state
did not meet that burden, and the courts failed to hold its lawyers to
the appropriate standard. In addition, the plaintiffs demonstrated that
the appointive system continued to exercise a discriminatory effect in
many individual school districts. Having met their burden in regard to
both intent and current effects, the plaintiffs were entitled to prevail
under the standard set forth in Hunter v. Underwood. 70
In 1992, however, the Virginia General Assembly adopted legisla-
tion authorizing jurisdictions to adopt elected school boards through a
referendum process. By the end of that year thirty-three counties,
seven cities, and two independent towns had held referenda; all voted
for elected school boards.' 7' Consequently, although the justice sys-
tem failed, the plaintiffs may take some comfort in watching this last
vestige of the age of massive resistance wither slowly away.
169. Plaintiffs presented anecdotal evidence concerning the dynamics of school board selec-
tion in several jurisdictions. Sometimes the pattern seemed not far advanced from the Surry
County model. In 55 percent black Southhampton County only two of seven school board mem-
bers in 1988 were black. The county supervisors, a majority of whom were white, selected a
white housewife whose children attended an all-white private academy over a qualified black
candidate who had the backing of the black community. Henrico County, a suburb of Rich-
mond, is almost 20 percent black and had never had a black school trustee. In 1988, blacks
nominated seven individual candidates to be considered for five school board seats, but the
county supervisors once again named an all-white board. Neighboring Chesterfield County had
one black county supervisor; his fellow supervisors rejected both his nominees, however, and the
county school board remained all white. When combined with the county-by-county data, this
anecdotal evidence demonstrated that in a significant number of cities and counties the appoin-
tive system continued to have a racially discriminatory result. On this basis the plaintiffs' expert
testified that "in some jurisdictions of the State of Virginia there was a continuing discriminatory
effect." Trial transcript I, supra note 45, at 70-71, 73, 75 (McCrary testimony); Brief of Appel-
lants, supra note 117, at 13-17.
170. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 222.
171. Act of Apr. 1, 1992, ch. 594, 1992 Va. Acts; Memorandum to the author from Audrey
Piatt, Virginia Board of Elections, Feb. 16, 1993.

